Regulating public automobile transport: the major issues by Babiczki, Dzmitry & Cramon-Taubadel, Stephan von
 
GERMAN ECONOMIC TEAM IN BELARUS 
76 Zakharova Str., 220088 Minsk, Belarus. Tel./fax: +375 (17) 236 1147, 236 4395 
E-mail: bmer@ipm.by. Internet: http://research.by/ 
 
PP/07/05 
 
Regulating public automobile transport: the major issues 
 
 
Summary 
Public automobile transport in Belarus is both socially and economically important. As 
the structure of the sector changes with the development of private providers, the 
system of state regulation of public transportation needs to be reformed as well. The 
two major types of regulations needed are regulations on technical and safety 
standards, and market regulations. This paper focuses on the need for independent 
regulatory bodies to provide sound regulation for local transportation markets. 
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1. Introduction 
There are many forms of public transport in Belarus: intercity and suburban trains, 
subways, trolleybuses, trams and buses, not to mention air and river transport. Yet 
for most regions and for the majority of the population the most important daily mode 
of transportation is urban bus transport – which is why this paper is dedicated to the 
problem of regulating this kind of transportation. 
The regulatory system governing public transportation in Belarus and the relevant 
legal framework are being shaped at this moment. This effort is being driven by the 
poor performance of the traditional public providers of passenger transportation 
services and the emergence of new, private ones. The sector that used to be 
dominated by state-owned regional monopolies until the late 90s is now open to 
competition. This creates an urgent need for a sound and up-to-date regulatory 
framework that can ensure fair competition among the different service providers and 
promote the development of this socially important service. 
This paper discusses the special characteristics of public transportation and why the 
government needs to be involved (part 2), describes basic types of regulation (part 3) 
and analyses different possible structures for the new regulatory bodies to be created 
(part 4). Final remarks and policy recommendations can be found in part 5. 
2. Public transport as a ‘club good’ 
Public transportation has some ‘public’ characteristics but nevertheless does not meet 
the classic definition of a public good. Firstly, the number of seats in a bus1 is limited 
so that some customers can be excluded from consumption and consumption is only 
non-rival up to this capacity limit. Up to the capacity limit, however, the public good 
characteristic of non-rivalry is present. Secondly, in most cases a driver or other 
person can charge a fee for a ride, eliminating the free-rider aspect common to public 
goods.  These characteristics of public transportation make it fall under the definition 
of a so-called ‘club good’. 
Club goods fall somewhere between public and private goods. Customer exclusion is 
possible, but the optimal number of consumers is always more than one. Adding 
marginal customer doesn’t influence the consumption of other customers, at least to 
the certain limit. Cinema is the classical example of a club good. 
Public transport also produces positive externalities since it eliminates congestion on 
roads: a bus takes on more passengers than private cars that would have to be used 
otherwise. 
Since public transportation is not a pure public good, there is no theoretical 
justification for regulating this sector like other infrastructure sectors where pure 
public goods are produced. Competing providers cannot generate monopoly profits in 
public transport, and the market mechanism can function similarly to a classical 
private-goods market. Nevertheless there is significant scope for government 
regulation of this sector because of the positive external effects and the social 
importance of public transportation. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapters. 
3. Types of regulation 
Depending on the priorities of a local administration there can be two major types of 
regulation of public transport. The first concerns regulations aimed at meeting safety 
                                                          
1 We will refer to buses throughout this paper, but public transportation can take other forms such as 
streetcars, subway trains, etc. 
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and environmental standards. The second type concerns market regulation to ensure 
that certain social goals (maintaining service on unprofitable routes, uniform tariffs 
etc.) are achieved. 
In this paper we will not discuss the issue of road usage fees. Heavy buses damage 
roads substantially more than private cars. Thus providers of transportation services 
should - at least in theory - cover a part of the road maintenance costs by paying a 
fee graduated to the weight of the bus. In this manner all final customers, i.e. the bus 
passengers, would be charged for road usage – and this by including the road tax in 
the price of the ticket. Yet, in this paper we will assume that street maintenance is 
financed by some type of fuel tax, part of which is funneled to the local 
administration. 
3.1. Regulation of safety and other standards. 
Public transportation plays an important role in the lives of the majority of the 
population. In small and medium Belarusian cities most working people use it to get 
to and from work on a daily basis. In rural areas public buses are the only means of 
transportation for most people with which to reach those places where they can 
receive public services. This implies that buses used for passenger traffic must be safe 
and reliable. The users of public transportation must be able to count on the vehicles 
being safe and clean: “If a bus is there it’s supposed to be safe because someone has 
checked it” – this kind of logic is commonly applied. Vehicles used in public 
transportation should also be sound from an environmental perspective since up to 
80% of the CO emissions into the atmosphere in Belarus are produced by motor 
vehicles including buses. All bus stops should be in suitable locations so as not to 
disturb other road traffic or increase the accident risk. 
The safety standards for public transportation vehicles should include: 
− Regular technical requirements, similar to private cars, 
− At least two exits on each vehicle, 
− Special technical requirements like a maximal allowed distance from the ground to 
the first step; bus route indications, emergency lighting, hand-holds etc., 
− The weight of the loaded vehicle shouldn’t exceed the maximum weight allowed on 
the roads being used, including bridges or other limited load structures. 
There should be no limitation on the vehicle’s age or the minimum number of seats as 
long as it fulfils all the technical requirements. The environmental standards should 
generally focus on the emissions produced. Furthermore, all providers of public 
transportation must be properly insured against accident and negligence risks. 
Another group of standards concerns the drivers of public buses. A driver should have 
a commercial driver’s license and be trained to respond appropriately to special 
situations (basic mechanic skills, provision of first aid, etc.). For the safety of 
passengers it must be ensured that the driver is not intoxicated and is able to drive 
the vehicle safely. Traditionally this is insured through a daily medical check prior to 
going on the road. Large firms employ a medic for this purpose; small companies may 
need to outsource this service. 
Meeting the above-mentioned standards by providers of transportation services 
requires the constant control by a public regulatory body. In the past, when passenger 
transportation services were provided by regional monopolies, the need for such a 
body did not exist. However, nowadays there are many public transportation service 
providers, hence the need for an independent regulatory body is obvious. 
Independence of the regulator is primordial. This agency must objectively inspect and 
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control all service providers, public and private, and apply the same standards to both 
without discrimination. 
3.2. Regulation of the market. 
Depending on what kind of policies the local authorities promote or what their urban-
planning priorities are, there may be a need for regulating the public transportation 
market. 
The local authorities may want to provide equal conditions for all residents of the city, 
for instance by ensuring that the cost of any ride from their home to downtown is the 
same. Or they may want to maintain service on an unprofitable route for retired 
people living in a suburb to get to the city, especially if such a service has been 
available for a long time in the past. Anyway, it is the right of all citizens (through 
their elected councils) to define the services their city will provide. 
This being so, a local administration could artificially create a monopoly for passenger 
transportation services by regulating supply. The supply could be limited in order to 
create monopoly rents on profitable routes, in order to use these rents to achieve 
stated aims – such as the provision of service on an otherwise unprofitable route. For 
example, a provider might receive the right to operate 10 profitable routes and 2 
unprofitable – with contractually determined numbers of seats and frequencies, and 
subject to regulated prices for all routes. In other words this is cross-subsidizing a 
fraction of the consumers who live in suburbs and villages at the expense of all others. 
This type of market regulation requires that the costs and profits of the providers be 
constantly monitored. This is necessary to determine which routes are profitable and 
which are not, and to measure the monopoly rent (the difference between profits with 
and without regulation). Obviously, the providers will have incentives to inflate the 
costs that they report, and to hide profits, or to exaggerate the losses associated with 
servicing unprofitable routes. The right to limit supply – i.e. to deny some providers 
the possibility to provide a service creates rent-seeking incentives that may end up 
fuelling corruption among local officials. 
Generally, if regulation is not done properly, market incentives will be destroyed 
leading to an increase of tariffs and an undersupply of the service (deficit). For this 
reason, to correctly structure the regulatory body is of great importance. 
4. Designing regulatory bodies 
4.1 Two main types of regulatory body  
The structure of a regulatory body at the local level depends on the functions it is 
meant to perform. If the only function of the body is to control implementation by 
providers’ safety and environmental standards (set by the central administration) then 
it is not really a regulatory body in the strict sense of the word at all. In this case, the 
function could easily be performed by already existing bodies, such as transport 
inspection, environmental protection services, etc. There will be no need for an 
independent regulator. 
However, if the national standards are deemed too low or do not meet the regional 
needs, the residents of some regions (cities) may want to adopt higher standards. 
Here too, the existing institutions can control the implementation of the higher 
standards set by the local council. Another approach would be to establish a special 
regulatory body that will develop the standards for providers of passenger 
transportation services and then control their implementation. Theoretically, there is 
no ultimate need for such a regulatory body, hence the decision either to establish it 
or not should be up to each local council. It is important though to ensure that the 
standards instituted and controlled are objective, and not a hidden way to 
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discriminate against private providers. All providers must always be subject to the 
same standards, without discrimination of any type. 
If the local authorities are to engage in the regulation of the passenger transportation 
market, a regulatory body becomes absolutely necessary to perform the following 
range of functions: 
- Plan the transportation network – roads and bus routes, 
- Determine which of the routes are profitable and which are not, 
- Share out routes among different providers, 
- Constantly control the costs and profits of the providers, 
- Manage the transportation network infrastructure. 
There are two possible structures for regulatory bodies. Both will be discussed, 
comparing the situations in Belarus and in Poland. 
Department under local administration. 
The functions of the regulatory body for public transportation can be filled by a 
department of the local administration. This scheme existed in Belarus up to 20042. 
Appropriate departments of the local executive committees regulated the markets. 
The main disadvantage of this system is that the local council usually owns the public 
transportation company and thus, will tend to attempt to create more favorable 
conditions for itself as compared to competitors. This system can function efficiently 
only if there is no competition on the market (which is not efficient in a broader 
sense) and where only one monopoly provider is allowed to provide service. 
Independent regulatory body. 
An independent regulatory body is created to ensure fair competition among different 
service providers. In international practice, regulatory bodies (sometimes called 
‘boards’) consist of representatives of all interested parties: local authorities, service 
providers, road maintenance providers, consumers and labor unions. The body is 
independent both from the local administration and from the service providers, and a 
statute regulates its activities. Such a body is likely to be more impartial with its 
decisions based on purely economic arguments instead of political ones, as in the case 
of a local administration being the regulator. All procedures within independent 
regulatory bodies should be fully transparent, especially route distribution decisions. 
The criteria for all actions and procedures should be clear and all decisions should be 
made in a public forum. 
Poland provides an excellent example of how a central government can delegate 
rights to structure regulatory systems for public transportation to regional authorities. 
According to the law “On communal economy” the gmina3 authorities should decide 
how the system of public services provision is to be organized (including public 
transport). Thus it is up to the regional or city councils to decide which of the two 
above-mentioned systems to use. Up to now, most regions and cities use the old 
system whereby a department of the local council is the operator. Yet, in more than a 
dozen cities independent regulatory bodies have been established (see Figure 1). The 
authorities of the majority of Polish cities have in the meantime come to appreciate 
the advantages of a regulatory system based on independent regulatory bodies and 
are in the process of establishing such boards. 
                                                          
2 Up to 2003 local councils were also the licensing authority for local providers. 
3 The lowest level of political division of Poland. 
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• Control of contract execution 
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Transportation company 
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• Setting schedules 
• Selling tickets 
• Providing transportation 
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Figure 1. The regulation of public transportation in Polish cities: Centralized 
system versus system with an independent regulator 
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4.2 The present Belarusian transportation market 
According to Belarusian legislation there are three major players in the transportation 
market: principal, operator and provider. The principals are the executive bodies of 
the local administrations – for urban and suburban transport, and the Ministry of 
Transport for intercity and international transport. The principals are required to 
contract transportation services from an operator. According to the “Provision on 
operators of passenger auto-transportation services”4, the operator from whom the 
principal obtains the service can be a legal entity or an individual entrepreneur. This 
means that, theoretically, any economic agent can become an operator. Moreover, it 
is not specifically mentioned in the document that there can be only one operator. 
Also, no criteria are given for selecting operators by the principal. According to the 
“Provision” an operator should fulfill the following functions: 
- Advising the principal on measures to develop a route network, 
- Operational control of keeping schedules by service providers, 
- Signing contracts on provision of transportation services with providers, 
- Coordinating bus schedules with the schedules of other modes of transport, 
- Operational control for implementing the safety standards by the service providers, 
- Checking tickets in the buses (with the help of Mintrans transport inspectors and 
representatives of the providers if needed), 
- Regulating and changing schedules, 
- Recommending tariff changes, 
- Preparing offers for the principal to limit the number of permits. 
The fact that the operator should be a legal entity or an entrepreneur is interesting: a 
department of the executive body of a local administration cannot become an operator 
according to the ‘Provision’. 
Currently, operators are either local executive bodies (i.e. the principals themselves) 
or state-owned transportation companies that used to be regional monopolies. The 
latter contradicts articles 36 and 50 of the law “On automobile transportation services” 
as well as the anti-monopoly legislation because in these cases private service 
providers are regulated and controlled5 by their major competitor – the state-owned 
service provider. Usually operators ask all service providers to sign contracts with 
them before they are allowed to provide service on their assigned routes. Since no 
standardized contracts are available, operators write them as they see fit, so that they 
quite often contain illegal clauses. For example, in Gomel and Mozyr there are clauses 
in the contracts forcing the private service providers to provide one free seat for 
privileged passengers without compensation. 
The procedures used by operators to share out routes frequently remains shrouded in 
obscurity. There are no precise rules: thus there have been cases in which certain 
private firms with technically unsound vehicles (prohibited shortly after) received 
permit for the most profitable routes while other entrepreneurs were driven out of 
business. In most cases special ‘competition committees’ share out the routes. These 
committees consist of representatives of the local authorities (the principal) and 
operators (state-owned providers), making fair competition among different providers 
nearly impossible. 
                                                          
4 By the Council of Ministers, February 8, 2005.  
5 Including the authority to share out routes, allow private firms to provide service, control their 
activities, and to issue and cancel permits to operate routes. 
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The administrations of some towns have started to auction off routes without any 
legal basis.6 In Babrujsk the procedure was organized like a regular auction and bids 
for permits reached as high as USD 7000. In Grodno, private providers were asked by 
the local council to make contributions to the city coffers and the ones who 
contributed most (up to USD 10000) received permits to operate the most profitable 
routes. 
Technical and safety standards are set by the central authorities (like the Ministry of 
Transport) and do not take into account regional differences. For example, 7-seat 
vans are prohibited from operation. This may be a useful measure for Minsk where the 
flows of transport and passengers are massive but is quite unrealistic in other cities 
where many suburban routes are used by only a few passengers.  
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Public transportation is not a public good, but a club good. There is no need for 
intervention on the basis of non-rivalry, competition will assure that the market 
remains contested, and that there are no monopoly profits provided the regulation is 
non-discriminatory and objective. However, there are two justifications for regulation. 
One is the need to develop technical and safety standards and control their 
implementation by the service providers. Secondly, regulation can achieve socially 
important goals like maintaining service on unprofitable routes and maintaining 
uniform tariffs. 
The decision about how to structure the regulatory framework for passenger 
transportation should be up to the regional authorities. Even some technical 
requirements, such as the minimal number of seats in a vehicle, may depend on 
specific regional conditions such as the size of the city, the parameters of the road 
network, and the degree of congestion. 
There is no need for a special regulatory body if the regulation only concerns safety 
aspects. In that case all the regulatory and control functions can be performed by 
existing state organizations. However, it must be ensured that the regulation of 
standards is not a hidden form of discrimination against private providers. 
If the local administration sees the need to intervene in the local transportation 
market in order to offset any ‘market failures’, then a specially created regulatory 
body would be best to perform the regulation. To ensure fair competition on the 
market and thus to better develop the sector, the regulator needs to be independent 
both from the local authorities and the service providers. It should consist of 
representatives of all interested parties like consumers, road maintenance services, 
labor unions as well as the service providers and the local authorities.  
It is an important task for the central authorities in Belarus to create a regulatory 
framework for public transportation that will allow local councils to establish 
independent regulatory bodies. At the same time national laws should ensure minimal 
standards and effective prevention of misuse and corruption.   
Dzmitry Babicki, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel  
Lector – Dzmitry Kruk  
September 2005 
                                                          
6  The national legislation requires government administrations and state-owned companies to request 
competitive bids for any service or good they buy, but clearly private provision of transportation 
services does not fall under this requirement. It would be a good idea to include transportation 
services, especially if the bidding was properly organized, but under current legislation that is illegal.   
